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Julien Jeandesboz 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the implications of the European Commission Communications on the 
evaluation and future development of FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) and 
the establishment of EUROSUR (European border surveillance system). It highlights that the 
evaluation of the activities conducted by the EU’s external borders agency over the period 2006–07 
fails to address the impact of such undertakings on fundamental rights and freedoms, solely focusing 
on technical issues and overall efficiency. It argues, furthermore, that the prospects for the 
development of FRONTEX, including through the proposal for EUROSUR, do not sufficiently 
address this matter either, while envisaging a significant reinforcement of the modalities of 
surveillance aimed at the EU’s external borders. The paper discusses the proposals presented in the 
two Communications, showing how they raise issues from a legal, technical, budgetary and political 
(i.e. the political desirability of additional measures for surveillance at the EU borders) standpoint. It 
concludes with a set of recommendations regarding how the prospects included in the two 
Communications should be approached. 
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REINFORCING THE SURVEILLANCE OF EU BORDERS: 
THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF FRONTEX & EUROSUR 
JULIEN JEANDESBOZ
* 
n 13 February 2008, the European Commission tabled a ‘border package’ consisting of 
three Communications
1 dealing with the issue of the EU’s external border management. 
Two of these documents, namely the Communication dealing with the evaluation and 
future development of FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union)
2 and the 
Communication on the creation of EUROSUR (European border surveillance system),
3 propose 
significant evolutions with respect to the role of the FRONTEX agency and the orientations of 
the EU’s integrated border management (IBM) concept. The evaluation of FRONTEX 
elaborated by the Commission services is timely: since the beginning of its operational phase in 
2005, the agency has considerably developed its activities in all its domains of competence, and 
the European Community (EC) subsidy to its budget has more than tripled over the period 
2006–08. The evaluation, however, falls short of critically assessing the consistency of 
FRONTEX’s activities with the fundamental values upheld by the EU. It also neglects two 
corollary aspects that have been pinpointed in various surveys of the activities of the agency and 
in institutional proceedings, namely the concern that the agency might be too overtly oriented 
towards migration control and predominantly influenced by the agendas of the member states.
4 
In this regard, it seems important to recall that FRONTEX is a first-pillar, Community body, 
                                                      
* Julien Jeandesboz is an Associate Researcher at the Centre d’études sur les conflits (Paris) and a PhD 
candidate in Political Science and International Relations, Sciences Po (Paris). The author would like to 
thank Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild for their invaluable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of 
this text. This paper expands on an earlier Briefing Paper for the European Parliament (“An Analysis of 
the Commission Communications on Future Development of FRONTEX and the creation of a European 
Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)”, PE 408.295, June 2008). A more detailed version of the piece 
was presented at the CHALLENGE workshop “Intelligence, borders and surveillance” on 21 April 2008 
at the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales in Paris, under the title “Information sharing and 
borders: The role and limits of FRONTEX”. 
1 This piece only deals with the first two Communications encompassed in the border package. For 
elements on the proposed ‘entry/exit system’, which constitutes the last part of the package, see S. 
Carrera, F. Geyer and E. Guild, The Commission’s New Border Package: Does it take us one step closer 
to a ‘cyber-fortress Europe’?, CEPS Policy Brief No. 154, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
March 2008. 
2 See European Commission, Report on the evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX Agency, 
COM(2008) 67 final, Brussels, 13 February 2008(a). 
3 See European Commission, Communication on examining the creation of a European Border 
Surveillance System, COM(2008) 68 final, Brussels, 13 February 2008(b). 
4 Both concerns were voiced by the European Parliament, in its February 2004 Report on the proposal for 
a Council regulation establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation 
at the External Borders (A5-0093/2004, February). The report notably suggests that the envisaged agency 
should “have a ‘more communitarian’ character” (ibid., p. 30), while warning about the foreseen 
competences of FRONTEX regarding return: “The European Parliament does not wish to entrust this task 
to an independent agency at [the] European level. There would be a clear risk that the Agency gets the 
character of an ‘expulsion agency’…in this specific case there would also be a danger of insufficient 
direct democratic control of such kind of operational activities” (ibid., p. 12). Both calls were left 
unanswered by the European Commission in its subsequent draft of the FRONTEX Regulation. 
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which should not only respect the EU fundamental values in its activities, but also work for their 
promotion, particularly in a field that touches upon crucial questions related to migration and 
freedom of movement. This policy paper first examines the contents of the two 
Communications, before providing a critical assessment of both the Commission’s evaluation of 
past FRONTEX activities and the prospects opened up by plans for the development of the 
agency and by EUROSUR. 
1.  Background: Surveillance and the EU’s ‘external borders’ 
The management of the EU’s external borders is a relatively recent concern for the European 
governmental arenas. Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the 
incorporation of the Schengen agreements into the acquis communautaire, this matter was 
mainly dealt with through the third pillar, and before the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Maastricht, through the Schengen mechanisms. From this evolution, the domain has retained 
two lasting characteristics: a strong emphasis on the policing dimension of border management 
and a persisting predominance of national actors. Indeed, the logic that presided over the 
conclusion of the Schengen accord and application convention was that the lifting of internal 
controls within ‘Schengenland’ should be accompanied by the reinforcement of controls at the 
external borders of the ensemble.
5 
Discussions about an EU border management model are thus relatively recent,
6 and despite the 
attempts at consolidation of late, elements of such a model remain scattered across a range of 
documents with varying statuses.
7 The first elements were laid out in the Council of the 
European Union’s Plan for the management of the external borders adopted on 14 June 2002. 
Other components came later on to refine the model, including the Schengen Border Code
8 and 
Practical Handbook for Border Guards.
9 It is, however, only in the last months of 2006, under 
the auspices of the Finnish presidency, that the Justice and Home Affairs Council came to an  
authoritative and formalised definition of the EU’s IBM model, comprising the following:
10 
                                                      
5 For further elements, see among others M. Anderson et al., Policing the European Union: Theory, Law, 
and Practice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995; see also D. Bigo, Polices en réseaux: l’expérience 
européenne, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996. This logic, however, has not precluded the persistence 
of internal checks, albeit in a rather ‘scattered’ fashion. See A. Faure Atger, The Abolition of Internal 
Border Checks in an Enlarged Schengen Area: Freedom of movement or a scattered web of security 
checks?, CEPS CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 8, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
March 2008. 
6 On this matter as well as on the creation of FRONTEX, see also H. Jorry, Construction of a European 
Institutional Model for Managing Operational Cooperation at the EU’s External Borders: Is the 
FRONTEX Agency a decisive step forward?, CEPS CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 6, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, March 2007.  
7 See P. Hobbing, “Integrated Border Management at the EU Level”, in T. Balzacq and S. Carrera (eds), 
Security Versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future, London: Ashgate, 2006, pp. 155–82. 
8 See European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation establishing a Community 
Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) of 15 
March 2006, (EC) No. 562/2006, OJ L 105/1, 13.04.2006. 
9 See the Commission Recommendation on establishing a common “Practical Handbook for Border 
Guards (Schengen Handbook)” to be used by Member States’ competent authorities when carrying out 
the border control of persons, C(2006), 5186 final, Brussels, 6 November 2006. 
10 See Council of the European Union, “Justice and Home Affairs, 2768
th Council Meeting”, Press 
Release, 15801/06 (Press 341), Brussels, 2006(b), p. 27. REINFORCING THE SURVEILLANCE OF EU BORDERS | 3 
 
•  border control, including border checks and the surveillance of borders, risk analysis and 
the gathering of intelligence; 
•  detection and investigation of cross-border crime; 
•  a four-tier access control model, including measures in non-EU countries, cooperation 
with neighbouring countries, border controls and controls within the area of free 
movement; 
•  interagency and international cooperation for border management; and 
•  coordination and coherence among the member states and with EU bodies. 
In this respect, the emphasis on control and surveillance is an enduring trend in the 
formulation of the EU’s IBM model. No mention is made, in the EU’s IBM of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms including the right to departure, the right to international 
protection and so forth. As stated unambiguously by the Council in earlier deliberations about 
the EU’s IBM concept, “[b]order management is a security function in which all Member States 
have a common interest that stems from the Schengen arrangement. First and foremost, border 
management is an area of policing, where security interests have to be met while fully 
recognizing the commitments in the field of international protection and human rights.”
11 In 
other words, freedom is balanced against security in EU border management, but security comes 
first. In addition, the predominance of national actors remains the rule: accordingly, the EU’s 
IBM concept speaks only about ‘coherence’ and ‘coordination’ between the member states and 
EU agencies and services. 
The creation of FRONTEX has not changed much in this perspective. From the onset, national 
governmental actors have been keen on reasserting their predominance over the agency and its 
possible evolutions. While preparatory studies had suggested the possibility of creating an EU 
“border police”,
12 subsequent developments resulted in the marginalisation of this proposal. An 
example of this can be found in the formal designation of FRONTEX: while the initial 
Commission proposal talked about a “European agency for the management of operational 
cooperation at the external borders”,
13 Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004, adopted after 
discussions among the member states, speaks of a “European agency for the management of 
operational cooperation at the external borders of the Member States of the European Union” 
(emphasis added). This predominance holds true for most of the agency’s domains of 
competence, including the provision of technical assistance and equipment or assistance in so-
called ‘return’ operations. The composition of the agency’s staff is also very telling in this 
respect, showing an important dependence upon ‘seconded national experts’ (SNEs) from 
member states’ border guard agencies and services: in January 2006, the FRONTEX staff 
numbered 28, including 27 SNEs; in December, the total staff of the agency amounted to 142, 
with 67 SNEs. 
                                                      
11 See Council of the European Union, Integrated Border Management: Strategy Deliberations, 
13926/06, FRONT 207/COMIX 826, Brussels, 2006(a), p. 3. 
12 Two initiatives are worth mentioning in this respect. The first one is a “Feasibility Study on the 
Creation of a European Border Police” elaborated jointly under Italian leadership by experts from 
Belgium, France, Germany and Spain in 2002 (“Feasibility study for the setting-up of a ‘European Border 
Police’”, JHA Ministerial Conference in Rome, 30 May 2002). The second one is a “Workshop on Police 
and Border Security” animated by the Austrian, Belgian and Finnish authorities the same year (Interview, 
DG H, General Secretariat of the European Union, Brussels, January 2007). 
13 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, COM(2003) 687 final/2, Brussels, 
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Furthermore, FRONTEX now seems to stand at the heart of the drive for surveillance of the 
borders unfolding across in the EU governmental arenas.
14 This trend is in fact composed of 
several elements. The first one is a reliance upon so-called ‘intelligence-led policing’, including 
in particular the use of risk analyses and profiles in the conduct of social control activities.
15 In 
this area, one of the main activities of FRONTEX since its inception has been the provision of 
risk analyses and feasibility studies on border surveillance, especially through the 
implementation of the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM), of which Brigadier 
General Ilkka Laitinen, current head of FRONTEX, is one of the drafters.
16 Laitinen himself has 
been clear as to the importance of such activities for his agency, stating in a public meeting at 
the European Parliament that “[a]ll FRONTEX activities are based on risk analyses, the ‘engine’ 
of FRONTEX activities”.
17 The second component of the EU drive in the surveillance of EU 
borders over the past few years has been the development of a series of technological devices, 
notably databases, for monitoring individuals on the move.
18 The third component – which is 
already available to national border guard agencies and services and if the EUROSUR proposal 
is followed, might take the form of an EU-wide mechanism – is the deployment of surveillance 
systems at or beyond the geographical ‘external’ borders. 
These considerations are important in light of the proposals for the future development of EU 
border management activities issued by the European Commission in its border package. As the 
following pages show, these proposals are mainly concerned with intensifying the surveillance 
of EU borders. In doing so, they seem to lead to an upsetting of the current repartition of 
competences in relation to border management in the EU, between the member states and the 
Community. In the process, they also further marginalise considerations of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of individuals, which should lie at the heart of EU preoccupations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
14 For additional details, see J. Jeandesboz, “Information sharing and borders: The role and limits of 
Frontex”, Paper presented at the CHALLENGE seminar on “Intelligence, borders and surveillance”, 
CERI, Paris, 21 April 2008 (unpublished manuscript). 
15 For a more in-depth reflection on the changes induced by the notion of intelligence-led policing in the 
work of police forces, its components and origins, see among others J. Sheptycki, In Search of 
Transnational Policing: Towards a Sociology of Global Policing, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. 
16 On this aspect and for comments on the CIRAM, see S. Carrera, The EU Border Management Strategy: 
FRONTEX and the Challenges of Irregular Immigration in the Canary Islands, CEPS Working 
Document No. 261, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, March 2007, as well as Jorry (2007), 
op. cit. 
17 See I. Laitinen, “Introductory talk to the Joint Parliamentary Meeting initiated by the European 
Parliament and the Parliament of Finland: ‘From Tampere to the Hague’”, Brussels, 2–3 October 2006. 
18 For an assessment, see F. Geyer, Taking Stock: Databases and Systems of Information Exchange in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, CEPS CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 9, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Brussels, May 2008. Additional elements can also be found in E. Brouwer, “Data 
Surveillance and Border Control in the EU: Balancing Efficiency and Legal Protection”, in T. Balzacq 
and S. Carrera (eds), Security Versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future, London: Ashgate, 
2006, pp. 137–54. REINFORCING THE SURVEILLANCE OF EU BORDERS | 5 
 
2.  The Communications on the future of FRONTEX and the creation of 
EUROSUR 
2.1  The report on the evaluation and future development of the 
FRONTEX agency 
The Commission’s evaluation of FRONTEX can be divided into two parts: the assessment of 
the agency’s activities in the period 2005–07 on the one hand, and the prospects for the 
development of its role and competences on the other. The former, as later discussed, remains 
rather uncritical of the past activities of FRONTEX, while the latter is highly ambitious in the 
possible expansion of the agency’s role and competences. The main criticism expressed in the 
Communication focuses on questions of effectiveness and coherence, but the document does not 
seek to address the impact of FRONTEX’s activities with respect to the fundamental freedoms 
and rights of individuals. While deemed a political evaluation in its opening paragraphs, the 
document then solely focuses on the technical issues that have arisen in the course of 
FRONTEX’s activities, a perspective that re-emerges in the options for the development of the 
agency. 
2.1.1  The evaluation of FRONTEX’s activities over the period 2005–07 
The evaluation of FRONTEX’s activities over the period 2005–07 is divided according to the 
six domains of competence devolved to the agency in Art. 2(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2007/2004:
19 
•  coordination of operational cooperation among member states’ border guard services – 
Art. 2.1(a); 
•  assistance to member states’ border guard services in the area of training – Art. 2.1(b); 
•  the carrying-out of risk analyses – Art.2.1(c); 
•  the follow-up of developments in research relevant to border control and surveillance – 
Art. 2.1(d); 
•  technical and operational assistance to member states’ border guard services – Art. 2.1(e); 
and 
•  support for member states’ authorities in organising joint return operations – Art. 2.1(f). 
In all these areas, the agency received a favourable appreciation from the Commission. The 
coordination of joint operations has received marked praise, notably concerning the important 
increase in the number of such operations over the period 2006–07 (with 8 in 2006 and 24 in 
2007). 
In relation to the coordination of operational cooperation among member states, especially 
for the realisation of joint operations, the Commission’s evaluation delivers an overall satisfecit 
for the agency’s activities,
20 with a strong insistence on quantifiable results, while remaining 
rather evasive in its qualitative assessment:  
                                                      
19 See Council of the European Union, Regulation establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union of 26 
October 2004, (EC) No. 2007/2004, OJ L 349/1, 25.11.2004. 
20 A full list of FRONTEX’s joint operations is featured in the statistical addendum to the evaluation 
report. See European Commission, Report on the evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX 
Agency – Statistical data, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2008) 150, Brussels, 13 February 
2008(d). 6 | JULIEN JEANDESBOZ 
 
Results of joint operations cannot be summarised solely in quantifiable terms. There 
are other benefits such as exchanging best practices and information between Member 
States and stimulating day-to-day cooperation between national border guard 
authorities. Nevertheless, the quantifiable results so far must be considered impressive: 
more than 53,000 persons, for 2006 and 2007 together, have been apprehended or 
denied entry at the border during these operations. More than 2,900 false or falsified 
travel documents have been detected and 58 facilitators of illegal migration arrested.
21  
In this respect, the evaluation report also welcomes the launch of the European Patrols Network 
(EPN)
22 and the establishment by the agency of the Central Record of Available Technical 
Equipment (CRATE) database.
23 
With regard to training, the report notes that a “total of 97 trainings, meetings and workshops 
including training of border guards and ‘training of trainers’ have been organised with a total of 
1,341 participants”.
24 It also highlights that the common core curriculum, established under the 
former Ad Hoc Centre for Training (ACT)
25 is currently under review. 
In relation to risk analyses, the report delivers a favourable appraisal of the agency’s record in 
delivering general and tailored risk analyses, as well as two feasibility studies, namely the 
MEDSEA
26 and BORTEC
27 studies: 
•  MEDSEA. This study was delivered to the Council Secretariat on 24 July 2006. 
MEDSEA focuses on the possibilities for enhancing operational cooperation in the 
patrolling of the EU’s southern maritime borders and the Mediterranean. It envisages in 
particular the setting-up of Mediterranean Coastal Patrol Networks and the 
establishment of information-sharing mechanisms between the border agencies and 
services of the member states, along with FRONTEX, including access to civilian 
maritime monitoring instruments. 
•  BORTEC. This study is dedicated to the identification of needs and feasibility of 
deploying a European border surveillance system focusing on the EU southern maritime 
borders, including the Mediterranean. It is the follow-up to the conclusions set out in the 
MEDSEA study. It was realised by a group of national experts from the member states 
directly concerned by the issue, together with support from a variety of EU agencies 
                                                      
21 See European Commission (2008a), op. cit., p. 3. 
22 The EPN is the result of a request issued to FRONTEX by the European Council, in the Presidency 
Conclusions of its December 2006 meeting. The EPN started its operations in May 2007 and currently 
consists of a permanent joint operation in selected areas of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean, 
coordinated by the agency and run by the border guard services of nine member states (Cyprus, France, 
Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain). 
23 The FRONTEX CRATE database was created at the request of the Council. It compiles lists of 
equipment that can be made available upon request to member state border-guard agencies and services.  
24 See European Commission (2008a), op. cit., p. 4. 
25 The ACT was one of several ad hoc centres established in the period 2002–05 under the SCIFA+ 
committee, in the follow-up of the 2002 Council Plan for the management of the external borders, 10019, 
Brussels, 14 June. On the ACT, see Council of the European Union (2003), Report on the implementation 
of programmes, ad hoc centres, pilot projects and joint operations (10058/1/03) Brussels, 11 June. 
26 As with BORTEC, the MEDSEA feasibility study is only available in a partially declassified version. 
See Council of the European Union (2006c), Frontex feasibility study on Mediterranean Coastal Patrol 
Networks, 12049/06, Brussels, 20 November. 
27 A partially declassified version of BORTEC is available in Annex 7 of the impact assessment 
document attached to the Eurosur communication. REINFORCING THE SURVEILLANCE OF EU BORDERS | 7 
 
and services (including the Joint Research Centre of DG Research, the European 
Defence Agency, the European Space Agency and the European Joint Satellite Centre), 
under the leadership of FRONTEX. The study was completed in December 2006, and 
most of the elements laid out in BORTEC, including the technologies to be used in 
border surveillance activities and the institutional layout required to incorporate these 
activities throughout the EU, have been encompassed in the EUROSUR proposal 
detailed below.  
Besides the discussion of the MEDSEA and BORTEC studies, the Commission report also 
highlights the collaboration between FRONTEX and Europol, with the former having 
contributed to the latter’s yearly Organised Crime Threat Assessment report, and both having 
jointly elaborated a tailored risk assessment on migration routes through the Balkans. It further 
stresses the importance in this domain of FRONTEX’s competence in terms of having the 
agency connected to the ICONet information exchange system between the national agencies 
and services in charge of the management of migrations.
28 Finally, it welcomes the involvement 
of FRONTEX in the discussions of the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the 
Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI).
29 
Concerning research in the field of border management, the report notes that the agency “has 
so far implemented 6 projects and 7 workshops/seminars on research and development”.
30 
FRONTEX has also been active in implementing the BIOPASS research project on automated, 
biometric border-crossing systems.
31 
On the provision of technical and operational assistance to member states, the evaluation 
singles out the setting-up of rapid border intervention teams (RABITs) as the main evolution for 
the agency. RABITs were established by Regulation (EC) No. 863/2007 adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council in July 2007. They basically constitute a pool of officials 
from member states’ border guard agencies and services that can be deployed upon request by a 
member state in situations of “urgent and exceptional pressure”.
32 RABIT officials operate 
under the authority of the requesting state. According to the FRONTEX evaluation report, there 
are currently 500 to 600 officials available for RABIT deployment, but the capacity has not 
been used so far.
33 
Finally, with reference to support for return operations, the evaluation report indicates that 
the agency “has provided assistance for the organisation of nine joint return operations. A 
further six projects have been taken forward on issues such as best practices for the acquisition 
                                                      
28 The Information and Coordination Network for Member States’ Migration Management Services was 
established by Council Decision 2005/267/EC of 16 March 2005 (OJ L 83/48, 1.4.2005). It has been 
operational since 2006, under the supervision of the European Commission. 
29 The CIREFI was created in 1992 as a discussion group within the Council for exchanging information 
about migratory movements between member states. 
30 See European Commission (2008a), op. cit., p. 6. 
31 See FRONTEX, BIOPASS: Study on Automated Biometric Border Crossing Systems for Registered 
Passengers at Four European Airports, Warsaw, August, 2007. As part of its research activities, it is 
foreseen in the Communication that FRONTEX will be significantly involved in the 7
th Framework 
Programme thematic research area on security, as well as in the proceedings of the European Security 
Research and Innovation Forum. 
32 See European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation establishing a mechanism for 
the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 
as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers of 11 July 2007, (EC) 
No. 863/2007, OJ L 199/30, 31.7.2007, Art. 1. 
33 See European Commission (2008a), op. cit., p. 7. 8 | JULIEN JEANDESBOZ 
 
of travel documents and in order to regularly identify common needs for joint return 
operations”.
34 This area has received the least favourable appreciation in the Commission’s 
evaluation, which points out: “This is a key task of FRONTEX, but results so far have shown 
that the frequency and intensity of that support is lagging behind the progress made with regard 
to operation coordination.”
35 
2.1.2  Prospects for future developments 
The prospects for the future development of FRONTEX consist of short/medium- and long-term 
proposals and recommendations. 
The evaluation report delivers 10 short/medium-term recommendations,
36 distributed among 
the following domains: 
•  Coordination of operational cooperation. The priorities include the possibility of 
improving the use of the CRATE database, including by reviewing how FRONTEX could 
acquire and lease equipment. It is also envisaged that some joint operations could be 
merged within the EPN (thus becoming semi-permanent ventures). Furthermore, the 
Commission underlines that the possibility given to the agency of opening specialised 
branches in specific countries
37 should be considered, with priority given to the southern 
maritime borders. 
•  Training. The report suggests that specialised training should be delivered through the 
agency “on relevant provisions of European and international rules on asylum, the law of 
the sea and fundamental rights, in order to contribute to the full respect of these norms 
and to a consistent approach to situations involving search and rescue coordination”.
38 
•  Risk analysis. The report stresses that risk analysis activities, especially joint analyses 
with other EU agencies, international organisations or border guard authorities of non-EU 
countries should be encouraged. More importantly, it proposes that FRONTEX be granted 
the management of ICONet and take over the activities of CIREFI. 
•  Research. The report indicates that FRONTEX, through its research unit, should make 
sure that the concerns and operational requirements of border guard services are taken 
into consideration in the development of new technologies. 
•  Technical and operational assistance. The Commission insists that FRONTEX should be 
allowed to acquire its own equipment to be used in the case of RABIT deployments. 
•  Return. First, the report highlights that putting FRONTEX in charge of the management 
of ICONet will enhance its profile in return-related activities. Second, it suggests that the 
CRATE database could be expanded to include equipment, particularly aircraft, available 
for joint return operations. 
                                                      
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See the impact assessment attached to the evaluation report (pp. 24–36) in European Commission, 
Report on the evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX Agency – Impact Assessment, 
SEC(2008) 149, Brussels, 13 February 2008(c). 
37 See Art.3(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 (op. cit.). So far, no such specialised branches 
have been opened. 
38 See European Commission (2008a), op. cit., p. 5. REINFORCING THE SURVEILLANCE OF EU BORDERS | 9 
 
The Communication on the future of FRONTEX further issues five long-term 
recommendations,
39 some of which might require changes in the existing FRONTEX 
Regulation. These recommendations include the possibility for FRONTEX to contribute to the 
Schengen evaluation mechanism, to engage in pilot projects with non-EU countries (notably 
those identified as problematic) and to develop activities concerning ‘horizontal integration’ 
between border guard and customs agencies and services. Two recommendations stand out, 
however, in that they seem to call for a significant evolution in the current functioning of the 
agency. On operational coordination, while committed to the idea that “[o]perational 
coordination has already proven itself the key instrument of the European Union in ensuring 
operational solidarity between Member States”, the report nonetheless points out that “the 
Commission intends to return to the question of a fully fledged European Border Guard system 
when experiences have been gathered” on the functioning of RABITs.
40 Yet in the meantime, 
the fifth and most ambitious prospect for the future development of FRONTEX lies in the 
suggestion to establish EUROSUR. 
2.2  The Communication on the creation of EUROSUR 
The EUROSUR Communication was prepared through the BORTEC feasibility study tabled in 
December 2006 by FRONTEX and an earlier study conducted at the request of the 
Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for Justice, Liberty and Security by the external 
consultancy Civipol Conseil.
41 
2.2.1 Rationale  of  the EUROSUR proposal 
The general concept of an EU border surveillance system is to integrate further the existing 
member state border-surveillance systems, with the long-term objective of developing common 
tools and instruments for border surveillance at the EU level. This initiative would ultimately 
lead to the establishment of a “common monitoring and information sharing environment”
42 
with a specific focus on the southern maritime borders of EU member states. Indeed, while the 
EUROSUR Communication envisages a system that would cover the EU’s land and sea 
borders, the priority is given to the southern maritime reaches of the Union. EUROSUR, from 
this standpoint, should contribute to the enhancement of the surveillance and information-
sharing capacities of border guard agencies and services. As highlighted in the Communication, 
“[a] European Border Surveillance System…should support the Member States in reaching full  
 
situational awareness on the situation at their external borders and increase the reaction 
capability of their law enforcement authorities”.
43 This is deemed necessary to meet three main 
objectives: 
¾  “[r]eduction of the number of illegal immigrants who manage to enter the EU undetected”; 
¾  “[i]ncrease internal security of the EU as a whole by contributing to the prevention of cross-
border crime”; and 
¾  “[e]nhance the search and rescue capacity”.
44 
                                                      
39 See European Commission (2008c), op. cit., pp. 36–42. 
40 Ibid., p. 10. 
41 It should be noted that Civipol Conseil is also a regular subcontractor of the French Ministry of Interior. 
42 See European Commission, Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR) – Impact Assessment, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2008) 152, Brussels, 13 
February 2008(e), p. 19. 
43 See European Commission (2008b), op. cit., p. 4. 10 | JULIEN JEANDESBOZ 
 
2.2.2  The Commission’s roadmap for setting up EUROSUR 
The EUROSUR Communication and its accompanying impact assessment map out four ‘policy 
options’, for a period running up to 2013. These constitute both alternatives from which to 
choose and a roadmap to be followed should the EUROSUR initiative be developed to its full 
potential. 
Policy Option 1 is the status quo option. It specifies that the development of EU border 
management activities follows the plans established in the 2004 Hague Programme and the May 
2005 Communication from the Commission on The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the 
next five years.
45 
Policy Option 2 involves “[i]nterlinking and streamlining existing surveillance systems and 
mechanisms at Member States’ level”.
46 As a first step, national coordination centres (NCCs) 
would be created in the eight member states concerned with the EU’s southern maritime border. 
The NCCs would act as information and intelligence-gathering hubs for border surveillance 
activities at the national level. The second step would involve interlinking the NCCs in a 
computerised network for the continuous, real-time sharing of information and intelligence, 
including FRONTEX, which in this situation could act as a border-management situation centre. 
In a third stage, activities would be focused on non-EU countries, chiefly those of the EU 
neighbourhood, for capacity-building purposes (equipment and training). 
Policy Option 3 includes Policy Option 2 and takes it further by envisaging the “[d]evelopment 
and implementation of common tools and applications for border surveillance at EU level”.
47 
This would allow for covering ‘blind spots’ in existing national border-surveillance systems, 
through the development of new technologies (particularly UAV
48 and earth observation 
technologies), new applications for information sharing (going beyond the question of 
interoperability among national information systems) and the establishment by FRONTEX, 
through its connection to such new applications, of a “common pre-frontier intelligence 
picture”.
49 
Policy Option 4 includes all of the previous ones within the objective of creating a “common 
monitoring and information sharing environment for the EU maritime domain” based on an 
“integrated network of maritime monitoring and surveillance systems” (a so-called ‘system of 
systems’).
50 While the previous policy options can involve all types of borders, the advanced 
elements proposed in Policy Option 4 will concentrate more specifically on EU maritime 
borders: first, the Mediterranean, the Canary Islands region and the Black Sea, and later on the 
entire Atlantic Ocean area, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. The core of the option would be to 
integrate within a common informational structure the various systems of maritime monitoring 
and surveillance in operation, European and international alike, whether they are used for 
                                                                                                                                                            
44 Ibid. 
45 See European Commission, Communication on The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five 
years, the Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM(2005) 
184 final, Brussels, 10 May 2005. 
46 See European Commission (2008e), op. cit., p. 25. 
47 Ibid., p. 29. 
48 UAV refers to unmanned aerial vehicles. 
49 See European Commission (2008e), op. cit., p. 33. 
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maritime safety, environmental protection, fishing activities or border monitoring purposes.
51 
The objective would be to provide a structure for collecting, fusing, analysing and disseminating 
information about all the movements occurring in the territorial waters of EU member states and 
beyond, operating 24 hours a day and in real time. FRONTEX, through an envisaged 
‘FRONTEX information system’, would play the role of a hub for analysing and disseminating 
information and intelligence. 
3. Analysis 
The present section puts the FRONTEX evaluation report and future plans for the development 
of the agency in perspective, with regard to legal (2.1), budgetary (2.2) and technical feasibility 
issues (2.3), and those associated with fundamental freedoms and rights (2.4). 
3.1  Legal issues: The expansion of FRONTEX’s competences 
The two Communications on the future of FRONTEX and the setting-up of EUROSUR open 
the way for significant developments in the role and competences of the agency. More 
specifically, should the EUROSUR roadmap be fully endorsed, this will lead to the 
establishment of FRONTEX as a node for sharing information and intelligence gathered through 
the surveillance apparatus deployed at the EU’s external borders. The implications of this 
expansion should be properly stressed, even more so since FRONTEX is a first-pillar agency 
(falling under Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community or TEC) and not a 
third-pillar body (under Title VI of the TEC). Since the prospects for the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which puts an end to the pillar structure, are uncertain at this time, such a 
consideration remains crucial for the future development of FRONTEX. 
Will the measures proposed by the Commission entail a modification of the legal basis of 
FRONTEX? The Commission’s proposals for the future development of the agency envisage 
an incremental, step-by-step approach. This incremental approach raises the issue of respect for 
the principle of legality and rule of law. It seems to have become a habit of EU agencies to 
develop activities in many fields without the proper legal basis, with legal aspects coming in ex 
post to validate these activities de facto (e.g. Europol). From this perspective, the short/medium-
term recommendations issued by the Commission’s evaluation report of the agency will not 
require the modification of Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004, except for the possibility to use the 
CRATE database in the context of return operations. The first three long-term measures 
mentioned above will widen the range of FRONTEX’s activities and competences, thus 
requiring a modification of the FRONTEX Regulation, albeit in a reasonable fashion. The last 
two recommendations, namely the possibility for the agency to obtain direct operational 
capacities and the development of EUROSUR, will change the scope of FRONTEX’s activities 
and require a significant revision of Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004. 
Will the measures change the repartition of competences between the Community and the 
member states? The long-term recommendations issued by the Commission will result in a 
significant modification of the current repartition of competences between the Community and 
the member states in the area of external borders, where the latter currently enjoy an ‘exclusive’ 
competence. The participation of FRONTEX in the Schengen evaluation mechanism will put 
the agency in a position to scrutinise member state activities in this area. Giving FRONTEX the 
possibility of running pilot projects with non-EU countries in the area of border management 
will give the agency an added degree of autonomy in the EU’s external relations and within the 
                                                      
51 This is also proposed in the European Commission’s Communication on an Integrated Maritime Policy 
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common foreign and security policy. Opening the potential for FRONTEX to run ‘horizontal 
integration’ activities creates opportunities for the agency to intervene in the internal 
organisation of state agencies and services of EU countries. Granting the agency operational 
capacities will pave the way for the creation of an EU ‘border police’ – an orientation that was 
initially envisaged before the setup of FRONTEX, but was explicitly turned down by the 
member states in the negotiations prior to the adoption of Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004.  
The creation of EUROSUR, finally, could also result in important modifications: 
•  Policy Option 2. The creation of NCCs, insofar as such centres do not yet exist, will 
amount to an EU-sponsored modification of the internal security apparatus of member 
states. The interlinking of NCCs into a computerised network for information exchange in 
this respect will raise the question of the principle of availability, which can be construed 
as an encroachment on member states’ sovereignty. 
•  Policy Option 3. The envisaged development of common tools and applications in the 
field of border surveillance amounts to the establishment of a common research and 
procurement policy in border security, and presupposes the establishment of a common 
market for security (and arguably defence) goods. While this orientation has been in 
preparation for some time, notably through the Commission’s Preparatory Action for 
Security Research initiative,
52 it has been consistently resisted by member states over the 
past two decades, on the basis that defence and security procurements are essential parts 
of their sovereign attributes. 
•  Policy Option 4. The integration of existing systems for the monitoring and surveillance 
of member states’ maritime domains is bound to create tensions, as it will result in the 
establishment of a common informational environment for borders that are still, under the 
current format, considered the exclusive competence of member states. This juxtaposition 
could be construed by the latter as an encroachment upon this exclusive competence. 
3.2  Budgetary issues: Current and foreseeable costs of the EU’s border 
surveillance activities 
As indicated in the introductory remarks, the EC subsidy allocated to FRONTEX has been 
multiplied by three and a half times over the period 2006–08, from €18,940,000 in 2006 to a 
forecasted €68,000,000 in 2008. The EC is the main contributor to the budget of the agency. 
The figures for 2008 are likely to be higher than anticipated, as was the case in 2006 and 2007, 
which saw the EC subsidy to the agency increase through subsequent amendments by roughly 
€7 million for each year. Of this funding, 68.17% was allocated to operational matters in 2006, 
with the figure set at 65.54% for 2008. Within the operational budget, sea border operations 
account for the highest proportion, reaching 70.63% in 2006 and 40.17% in 2007 (which has 
seen an increase in the amounts spent on land operations, from 6.96% to 17.71%). The overall 
increase for operational expenditures, in this respect, amounts to 140% (with the 2008 budget 
included).
53 These figures are substantially higher than the initial funding projected for the 
agency: the impact assessment document notes in this respect that “the 2008 budget will be 
approximately 70 million euro, which is as high as the 2013 budget initially foreseen for the 
                                                      
52 See D. Bigo and J. Jeandesboz, Review of security measures in the 6
th Research Framework 
Programme and the Preparatory Action for Security Research, Standard Briefing Note for the European 
Parliament, FWC LIBE, Lot 7, C1/SC6, June 2008. 
53 See House of Lords European Union Committee, FRONTEX: The EU external borders agency, report 
with evidence, 9
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Agency”.
54 FRONTEX is thus turning into a costlier-than-expected venture for the EU budget, 
and will likely be even more so given the evolutions proposed by the European Commission. 
Are these expenses justified in terms of results? The evaluation report presents as an 
achievement the fact that, through FRONTEX operations, roughly 53,000 persons were arrested 
or denied entry over the period 2006–07. Yet, the report falls short of providing a qualitative 
assessment of this result. According to OECD data, net migration for the EU-25 (plus Norway 
and Switzerland) in 2005 was more than 2.5 million. In addition, based on the Commission’s 
own data, 800,000 persons were refused entry in the EU-25 in the same year.
55 In the meantime, 
the agency spent €24,128,619 in operational expenses (all borders included), which makes for a 
ratio of €455 per person. This breakdown, of course, does not include the operational costs 
taken up by the member states, nor does it take into account the so-called ‘return operations’ 
coordinated by FRONTEX, which concerned 287 persons in 2006–07 and for which budget 
details are not included in the statistical annex. In addition, it does not take into account the 
personal injury costs linked to individuals who might have died during FRONTEX operations. 
In a recent series of decisions involving acts of violence perpetrated by the Turkish authorities 
upon migrants,
56 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held Turkey liable for 
paying the plaintiffs for pecuniary damage, for amounts reaching respectively €74,500, €96,000 
and €183,000 (the latter for a case involving several applicants). Such costs, which might arise 
in the future, also have to be taken into consideration in evaluating the results of FRONTEX’s 
activities. As a general conclusion, it is worth indicating that given the amounts spent by the 
agency, the results are unimpressive. This point has been stressed in a recent report of the UK 
House of Lords European Union Committee concerning the increase in the resources allocated 
to FRONTEX for 2008: “We believe the increased resources may usefully lead to a modest 
increase in the number of operations in 2008, but should be concentrated on further increasing 
the quality of those operations.”
57 
What are the foreseeable costs of the measures proposed by the European Commission? So far, 
the Commission has not proposed a detailed cost analysis for the measures envisaged under the 
FRONTEX evaluation and EUROSUR Communications. 
•  Short/medium-term measures for the development of FRONTEX. Most of the costs 
incurred by these measures will have to be met through the FRONTEX budget. In 
particular, measures related to the expansion of the agency’s operational capacities, in 
view of past trends, are likely to have a strong impact. These measures include the merger 
of joint operations with the EPN, which will eventually cut down operational deployment 
costs but will nonetheless have a significant initial setup cost as well as cumulated costs 
for the deployment and maintenance of equipment co-financed by FRONTEX. The 
possibility for the agency to acquire its own equipment will also put additional strain on 
the FRONTEX budget, as well as an expanded role in return operations as projected, 
which might include the deployment of equipment and personnel. The other costs will 
most likely represent a smaller increase. Finally, the involvement of FRONTEX in 
research on border management technologies will not have a direct effect on the agency’s 
                                                      
54 See European Commission (2008c), op. cit., p. 7. 
55 See European Commission, Second annual report on the development of a common policy on illegal 
immigration, smuggling and trafficking of human beings, external border controls and the return of 
illegal residents, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2006) 1010, Brussels, 19 July 2006.  
56 See Süheyla Aydin v Turkey (Application No. 25660/94, ECtHR judgement of 24 May 2005); see also 
Yasin-Ates v Turkey (Application No. 30949/96, ECtHR judgement of 31 May 2005); and also Erdogan 
and others v Turkey (Application No. 19807/92, ECtHR judgement of 25 April 2006). 
57 See House of Lords European Union Committee (2008), op. cit., p. 29. 14 | JULIEN JEANDESBOZ 
 
budget, but is likely to have an impact on other elements of the EU’s budget, especially 
the Community’s 7
th Research Framework Programme (FP7)
58 and other initiatives that 
the Commission might want to set up.
59 
•  Long-term measures. The costs of the long-term measures (aside from EUROSUR, 
which is dealt with below) remain difficult to assess. Participation in the Schengen 
evaluation mechanisms and activities of horizontal integration between member states’ 
border-guard and customs agencies and services will probably not add significant 
expenses, since they do not involve the deployment of equipment and rely on existing 
structures. The budgetary impact of the possibility for FRONTEX to set up joint projects 
with non-EU countries will depend on whether FRONTEX will fund these projects from 
its own budget or whether it will implement projects funded under the EU’s external 
relations instruments. Costs will also be linked to the scope of such projects.
60 Finally, 
regarding the development of direct operational capacities within FRONTEX, there are no 
previous experiences that can enable even a rough assessment of the costs. FRONTEX 
would become the first EU security agency with such capacities. Such developments 
would involve a major increase in both administrative and operational costs. 
•  EUROSUR. The main costs pertaining to the development of EUROSUR will not be 
borne by the FRONTEX budget. The development of national coordination centres and 
national border surveillance systems, and the interlinking of these centres and systems 
with FRONTEX are covered under the 2004–06 Schengen facility (€961.4 million) and 
the 2007–09 cash flow and Schengen facility (€799.3 million). Under the 2007–13 
external borders fund (with a total commitment of €1,820 million), these issues have been 
flagged as specific priorities, increasing the rate of Community contributions from 50% to 
75%. Support for the border management infrastructure of non-EU countries, while not 
yet evaluated, will come under existing Community external relations instruments (most 
likely the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument). Research and 
development for common application tools will be taken up by the FP7. The 
establishment of mechanisms for the ‘common pre-frontier intelligence mechanism’ will 
also fall under the external borders fund. For the last steps in the development of 
EUROSUR, namely the establishment of an information-sharing environment about select 
areas of the EU’s external maritime borders and its later extension, figures and funding 
schemes are not available.
61 
The main point that can be made from of this survey is that the proposed measures for the future 
development of FRONTEX and EUROSUR will represent a major financial effort for the 
Community, not only through the budget of the agency, but also through a variety of other 
instruments, including the external borders fund and external relations instruments.  
                                                      
58 Under FP7, Theme 9 (Space) has been allocated €1,430 million and Theme 10 (Security) €1,400 
million. Border security is one of the four priority areas in these thematic domains. 
59 For example, the Preparatory Action on Security Research initiative, which was set up in 2004 by the 
Commission and included projects on border surveillance technologies, was allocated a budget of €44.5 
million of Community contributions. See D. Bigo and J. Jeandesboz (2008), op. cit. 
60 As an illustration, the EU has been running such a project in its neighbourhood since November 2005, 
the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). The EUBAM was 
initially allocated €4 million under the Commission’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism for the first 6 months, 
completed by another €16 million for the following 18 months (amounting to €20 million for the first 24 
months of the mission) under the TACIS instrument.  
61 See the EUROSUR impact assessment document – European Commission (2008e), op. cit., p. 54. REINFORCING THE SURVEILLANCE OF EU BORDERS | 15 
 
3.3  Technical issues: The feasibility of EUROSUR 
The question of the technical feasibility of some of the projected steps remains unanswered, 
particularly concerning the development of EUROSUR. The related Communication envisages, 
as a first step beyond the status quo option, the interlinking and streamlining of existing national 
border-surveillance systems. These systems, however, have taken years to develop, and in most 
cases they are not even interconnected at the national level, for reasons tied to either technical 
issues of hardware and software compatibility, legal matters such as data protection laws or 
simply bureaucratic feuds among the national border-guard agencies and services. The question 
of feasibility, in this respect, will become even more pressing should the fourth policy option 
previewed in the EUROSUR Communication be selected as the desirable outcome. Integrating 
civil protection, the monitoring of maritime traffic and border surveillance systems is something 
that has not even been implemented at the national level. To envisage such a development by 
2013, as suggested in the EUROSUR Communication, seems unrealistic at best, as it 
presupposes the political willingness of member states, the technical feasibility of integrating 
systems functioning on incompatible hardware and software, and the administrative capacity of 
national agencies and services in charge of monitoring maritime traffic, civil protection at sea 
and border surveillance (not to speak of, again, their willingness to abide by the directives 
issued by the European and national authorities). These matters are insufficiently addressed in 
the Commission’s impact assessment. Furthermore, this assessment seems to draw heavily from 
the BORTEC and MEDSEA feasibility studies undertaken by FRONTEX, which are not 
publicly available in full, thus precluding the possibility of a complete, conclusive evaluation of 
EUROSUR. 
3.4  Fundamental freedoms and rights: The current and foreseeable 
impact of FRONTEX’s activities on EU core values 
The evaluation report produced by the Commission services fails to address satisfactorily the 
impact of FRONTEX’s activities in the past on the fundamental freedoms and rights of 
individuals. This also holds true with regard to the developments foreseen for the agency’s role 
and competences. In particular, the principle of proportionality seems to receive very little 
attention: the question, in this perspective, is whether the measures proposed by the 
Commission are suitable and necessary in view of the agency’s record of activities. Again, it is 
important to recall that FRONTEX is a first-pillar, Community body, which implies that it not 
only has an obligation to uphold the fundamental values of the EU, but also to promote and 
expand their reach as necessary. 
With respect to past activities, the Commission’s assessment makes no mention of some of the 
questions raised by the operations coordinated by FRONTEX, notably in the Canary Islands 
region (HERA II and III operations). These operations are aimed in part at intercepting crafts 
suspected of carrying irregular migrants in the territorial waters of Mauritania and Senegal and 
at returning them back to the coast; thus, they deny the passengers of these crafts the possibility 
of lodging an asylum application except if the interception took place beyond the territorial 
waters of those states. Such practices are already problematic from the standpoint of 
fundamental freedoms and rights, and all the more so since the interception in Mauritanian and 
Senegalese territorial waters took place on the basis of bilateral agreements between Spain and 
the relevant authorities of both countries, which have not been made public.
62 In this case, 
FRONTEX is found in a position where it has not only facilitated what can be construed as a 
                                                      
62 See S. Carrera (2007), op. cit.; see also M. Mir, Managing the EU’s External Frontiers: Lessons to be 
Learned from FRONTEX’s Action in the Canary Islands, Standard Briefing Note for the European 
Parliament, April 2007. 16 | JULIEN JEANDESBOZ 
 
breach in the principle of protection for asylum-seekers and refugees, but also participated in 
practices of secrecy, which run against all EU and member state principles of democratic 
scrutiny and transparency.
63 
The envisaged development of the agency’s activities also gives rise to set of issues in the area 
of fundamental freedoms and rights. First, these issues have not been included in the scope of 
the Commission’s evaluation of the agency. The EUROSUR Communication, furthermore, is 
remarkably expeditious, since it dedicates only one paragraph to these matters:  
The different activities referred to in the previous sections may involve the processing 
of personal data. Thus, the principles of personal data protection law applicable in the 
European Union are to be observed, meaning that personal data must be processed 
fairly and lawfully, collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. The processing of 
personal data within the context of EUROSUR must therefore be based on appropriate 
legislative measures, which define the nature of the processing and lay down 
appropriate safeguards.
64 
The possibility opened up for FRONTEX to handle personal data in the near future is something 
that was not foreseen in the original attributions of the agency, and one might wonder whether 
this step is necessary for the agency to perform its tasks. The sharing of personal data in a 
system such as the one outlined by the EUROSUR Communication, through which information 
would be gathered, handled and dispatched in real time to a very large contingent of agencies 
and services across eight or more member states, will not offer the necessary guarantee in terms 
of privacy and purposive collection. This is all the more true since the EUROSUR proposal 
opens up the possibility of relying on ‘automated capabilities to recognise patterns, analyse 
trends, and detect anomalies and thereby predict risks’
65. The combination of a large-scale 
information sharing system, handling personal data, and relying on automated processes 
(otherwise called ‘datamining’), opens up the possibility for severe encroachment on the 
principles which lie at the heart of EU values concerning the operation of databases and 
information systems. 
Furthermore, the EUROSUR proposal is based on the notion that FRONTEX, through new 
access to information, will be able to provide a ‘common pre-frontier intelligence picture’. ‘Pre-
frontier’ seems to imply that cooperation with non-EU countries in intelligence-gathering will 
be increased. This implication also applies to the possibility for FRONTEX to have a mandate 
for running pilot projects with relevant non-EU countries.
66 While cooperation with non-EU 
                                                      
63 This situation is further aggravated by the attitudes of senior FRONTEX officials about their 
responsibilities in these matters. In one striking occurrence, the senior staff of the agency failed to attend 
an important public hearing organised by the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs on “Tragedies of Migrants at Sea” (July 2007), despite the strong insistence of 
the chairman of the committee that they be present. 
64 See European Commission (2008b), op. cit., p. 11. 
65 European Commission, 2008e, 64. 
66 FRONTEX has working arrangements with Switzerland, Russia and Ukraine. Mandates have been 
issued for negotiations with (among others) Cape Verde, the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, 
Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal and Turkey. The evaluation report itself also notes that “the 
possibility of developing a cooperation between FRONTEX and Belarus could be explored” (European 
Commission, 2008a, op. cit., p. 9). Considering the currently strained relationship between most EU 
governments and institutions and the Belarusian authorities, and the record of the latter as far as respect 
for fundamental freedoms and rights is concerned, this proposal should have raised a few eyebrows 
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countries should undeniably be welcomed, such ventures cannot be undertaken at the expense of 
EU fundamental values. Cooperation with several of these countries in areas that are as sensitive 
for fundamental freedoms and rights as border management is a troubling prospect, and even 
more so if this should lead, in the perspective of EUROSUR’s common pre-frontier intelligence 
picture, to collaboration with intelligence services. There are no guarantees that the principles of 
democratic scrutiny, transparency, proportionality and privacy will be upheld should such 
cooperative ventures take place, nor is there a mechanism to ensure the proper scrutiny of such 
developments. 
Underlying these issues, finally,are two questions: 
•  Should FRONTEX’s activities, being those of a first-pillar body, be more developed 
in the field of fundamental freedoms and rights? The answer is clearly positive. Some 
of the measures proposed by the Commission, such as the development of specialised 
courses in asylum and human rights law in FRONTEX’s training activities, are thus 
welcome. They should be further developed. More specifically, since FRONTEX has 
been involved in the coordination of return operations, and since almost all of the joint 
operations it has coordinated so far have had to do with migration control, the possibility 
of the agency contributing to the rights of individuals seeking protection in the course of 
its operations could be explored. It seems that for the time being, the agency is lacking the 
capacity to provide legal support to persons seeking protection and it has no means of 
ensuring that the rights of these persons are guaranteed in the operations it coordinates. 
There is furthermore a necessity to make the agency more accountable and more 
transparent to democratic scrutiny. The upholding and promotion of fundamental 
freedoms and rights should be considered a crucial part of a comprehensive, 
integrated, border management doctrine, and an integral part of the mandate and 
activities of FRONTEX. 
•  Does the EU and its member states need additional measures for surveillance of their 
external borders? This is the core underlying issue. As highlighted earlier in section 2.3, 
the record of FRONTEX given the amounts spent on it in 2006–07 is far from impressive. 
The only result of the agency’s activities might well be the displacement of the routes 
available to migrants to areas even more remote and perilous, further endangering lives 
and greatly reducing the possibilities available for those individuals seeking protection to 
do so. The position of the EU institutions and the member states, in this respect, has 
always been that a balance should be found between security requirements and 
obligations in the field of fundamental freedoms and rights. The case of FRONTEX 
underscores how such a ‘balance’ mechanism operates, namely by playing out almost 
systematically in favour of security requirements. It is important to recall again, from 
this viewpoint, that security cannot be considered of equal value to freedom and an 
objective in itself. Security is a means towards greater freedom and the protection of 
fundamental rights.
67 
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4.  Conclusions and recommendations 
This survey of the Commission’s evaluation of FRONTEX and proposals for the latter’s future 
development included in the Commission’s border package highlights that several issues have 
been left unaddressed and a number of questions remain unanswered as far as the activities of 
the EU’s border agency are concerned. Typically, the issue of fundamental freedoms and rights 
is underplayed in both of the related Communications. Moreover, the documents also fail to 
provide a balanced qualitative assessment of the agency’s activities, and of the added value of 
the steps envisaged for its development. Altogether, this is illustrative of the ‘more is better’ 
logic that currently seems to pervade the developments surrounding questions of security and 
surveillance in the Union, particularly in relation to the EU’s border and migration policies. It is 
important to reassert, in this respect, that more is not always better, especially when the 
projected developments do not acknowledge legitimate concerns about accountability and 
transparency, nor the imperatives of international protection for endangered persons and the 
upholding of fundamental rights and freedoms.  
In light of our survey, several recommendations can be made:  
1.  The activities of FRONTEX should be submitted to a full evaluation of their impact on 
fundamental freedoms and rights, including the responsibility to protect. The European 
Parliament should insist that such a focus be included in the parameters of the independent 
evaluation of the agency to be commissioned in 2008 by the FRONTEX Management 
Board, and insist that the results of this report be made public. Should this evaluation be 
found lacking in this respect, the European Parliament should commission its own 
assessment.  
2.  The European Parliament should insist that a unit focusing on legal assistance to persons 
seeking international protection be set up within FRONTEX. Officials from this unit would 
be present in all FRONTEX joint operations, to assist asylum-seekers and persons seeking 
international protection. Efforts to establish a cooperation agreement between FRONTEX 
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) should also be 
accelerated. It could especially open the possibility for UNHCR officials to participate in 
FRONTEX operations, with potential support from the external borders fund, and give the 
UNHCR an observer status on the agency’s Management Board.
68 
3.  The development of EUROSUR should be conditioned on the previous two outcomes. 
Particularly the need for the envisaged FRONTEX information system to include personal 
data should be assessed. In this regard, the opinion of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor should be requested before any new developments can take place. Additionally, 
further progress concerning the EUROSUR initiative should be halted until the objectives 
set out in The Hague Programme are fulfilled.  
4.  The European Parliament should request that FRONTEX documents, including the 
evaluation reports of the joint operations conducted by the agency, its risk analyses and 
feasibility studies, are made publicly available. This step would enhance the transparency of 
EU activities in this area for European citizens and allow for independent external analyses 
and evaluations of FRONTEX to be developed. 
 
                                                      
68 So far, the UNHCR has established a liaison team at the FRONTEX Warsaw headquarters. See the 
declarations of M. Soufiane Adjali, UNHCR Senior Liaison Officer to FRONTEX, in the House of Lords 
2008 report on the agency (op. cit., pp. 70–73). 19 | 
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he familiar world of secure communities living within well-defined territories and enjoying all the 
celebrated liberties of civil societies is now seriously in conflict with a profound restructuring of 
political identities and transnational practices of securitisation. CHALLENGE (Changing Landscape 
of European Liberty and Security) is a European Commission-funded project that seeks to facilitate a more 
responsive and responsible assessment of the rules and practices of security. It examines the implications of 
these practices for civil liberties, human rights and social cohesion in an enlarged EU. The project analyses 
the illiberal practices of liberal regimes and challenges their justification on the grounds of emergency and 
necessity. 
The objectives of the CHALLENGE project are to: 
•  understand the convergence of internal and external security and evaluate the changing character of the 
relationship between liberty and security in Europe; 
•  analyse the role of different institutions in charge of security and their current transformations; 
•  facilitate and enhance a new interdisciplinary network of scholars who have been influential in the re-
conceptualising and analysis of many of the theoretical, political, sociological, legal and policy 
implications of new forms of violence and political identity; and 
•  bring together a new interdisciplinary network of scholars in an integrated project, focusing on the state 
of exception as enacted through illiberal practices and forms of resistance to it. 
The CHALLENGE network is composed of 21 universities and research institutes selected from across the 
EU. Their collective efforts are organised under four work headings:  
•  Conceptual – investigating the ways in which the contemporary re-articulation and disaggregation of 
borders imply a dispersal of practices of exceptionalism; analysing the changing relationship between 
new forms of war and defence, new procedures for policing and governance, and new threats to civil 
liberties and social cohesion. 
•  Empirical – mapping the convergence of internal and external security and transnational relations in 
these areas with regard to national life; assessing new vulnerabilities (e.g. the ‘others’ targeted and 
critical infrastructures) and lack of social cohesion (e.g. the perception of other religious groups). 
•  Governance/polity/legality – examining the dangers to liberty in conditions of violence, when the state 
no longer has the last word on the monopoly of the legitimate use of force.  
•  Policy – studying the implications of the dispersal of exceptionalism for the changing relationship 
among government departments concerned with security, justice and home affairs, along with the 
securing of state borders and the policing of foreign interventions. 
 
 
The CHALLENGE Observatory 
The purpose of the CHALLENGE Observatory is to track changes in the concept of security and monitor 
the tension between danger and freedom. Its authoritative website maps the different missions and activities 
of the main institutions charged with the role of protection. By following developments in the relations 
between these institutions, it explores the convergence of internal and external security as well as policing 
and military functions. The resulting database is fully accessible to all actors involved in the area of 
freedom, security and justice. For further information or an update on the network’s activities, please visit 
the CHALLENGE website (www.libertysecurity.org). 
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